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## WORLD-POLITICS.

LONDON: ST. PETERSBURG: BERLIN: WASHINGTON.

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LONDON, *February, 1906.*

WE thought last month we were merely taking part in a General Election. In fact, we were witnessing a vast elemental convulsion. The writer who compared the movements of the polls with "an earthquake in the Himalayas launching down whole hillsides, swinging forests from the root, and burying cities in ruin," scarcely exaggerated. The magnitude of the Liberal and Free-Trade victory, without precedent in the political history of the last seventy years, surprised no one more than the victors themselves. They expected, of course, to win; they did not expect to trample their opponents almost out of existence. Yet this is what they have accomplished. The Unionist members of Parliament, who after the General Election of 1900 numbered 402, have shrunk to a group, so disunited and so bitter in its disunion that it hardly deserves to be called a party, of 157. The Liberals and the Labor representatives, who five and a half years ago were no more than 186, are now 430 strong. The Nationalists have captured one seat more than they held in 1900, and face the new Parliament a compact and disciplined body of 83. The Liberal, Labor and Nationalist majority over the Unionists is 356. The Liberal and Labor majority over the combined forces of the Unionists and the Nationalists, who might on some matters be found acting in unison, is 190. The Liberal majority over all other parties—Labor, Nationalist and Unionist—is 88. Such is the record in figures of one of the most amazing transformations in English politics. But figures are far from telling the whole tale. Only four of the Ministers in the late Cabinet escaped destruction, and of these one only survived because of a split between the Labor men and the Liberals, and another was defeated in his

own constituency and had to reenter Parliament through the back door of a safe seat in Dublin. The rest, with the late Prime Minister at their head, were ignominiously rejected. Seats that were regarded as so irredeemably Conservative that they had not been contested for twenty years were last month attacked and carried. Members who had represented their constituencies for more than a generation found themselves miraculously turned adrift. Social and territorial influences, faithful service, a distinguished career, historic associations availed them nothing. Wales returned not a single Conservative. Scotland was barely less emphatic in its condemnation of the late Government. The English counties and the English boroughs plunged unhesitatingly into the flowing tide. London, which a month ago was represented by 51 Unionists and 11 Liberals, is now represented by 42 Liberals and 20 Unionists. Counting votes and not seats, it appears that a Unionist plurality of about 300,000 has been converted into a Liberal plurality of some 600,000. As one stronghold of Toryism after another was captured, it began to be doubtful whether such a thing as a safe Conservative seat any longer existed. When Mr. Balfour's defeat was made known, two Conservative candidates who felt assured of victory in their own constituencies offered to retire in his favor. Their offers were not accepted, and on the whole it was just as well that they were not, for both candidates were rejected. Birmingham alone stood firm, and no one, I think, grudged Mr. Chamberlain his magnificent success in the city he has served so splendidly, first as Mayor and then as Member of Parliament, for five-and-thirty years. But no one, on the other hand, mistakes the meaning of that success. It was not a political, but a personal, triumph. Knowing Birmingham pretty well, I have no hesitation in saying that it voted far less for Tariff Reform than for Mr. Chamberlain. It has faithfully clung to him through all the somersaults of his political career; I do not doubt that it will continue to cling to him through whatever surprises and changes he may still be capable of. Moreover, although Birmingham itself proved impregnable, the Birmingham area was successfully invaded. In what for the past twenty years has been considered the special sphere of the Chamberlain influence, the Liberals carried no less than twenty-one seats. That is an achievement which considerably discounts Mr. Chamberlain's triumph in Birmingham itself. Birmingham, it is clear, is no longer the

Midlands. Still less is it England. Outside of the city's limits there was no place, from the Isle of Wight to the Shetlands, where the Unionists were able to make any sort of a stand.

Political elections are rarely fought exclusively on a single issue, and last month's campaign was not determined solely by the Free-Trade instincts of Great Britain. The Liberals were greatly helped by the Chinese Labor question, and they made the amplest and in many cases the most unscrupulous use of its assistance. They were also helped by the unmeasured hostility of the Non-conformists towards the Education Act of 1902. In all constituencies where no Labor candidate was running, the Labor vote went to swell the Liberal majority, chiefly because the late Government did nothing to reverse the decisions that made Trades-Unions liable for damages and declared picketing illegal. Again, the Licensing Act passed by Mr. Balfour's Cabinet was regarded by many Englishmen who are far from being Temperance agitators as an unworthy surrender to the brewers. These were tangible allies on the Liberal side, and their influence was considerably increased by the natural "swing of the pendulum," the inevitable discontent that fastens upon any Government that has been long in power, the memory of several grave administrative scandals arising out of the South-African war, and above all by the conviction that Mr. Balfour's failure to make his fiscal policy intelligible to the multitude and his tactics of evasion and subterfuge dishonored both the country and the Parliament. All this, undoubtedly, had its weight. A direct plebiscite on the question of Protection or Free Trade most probably would not have shown such an overwhelming majority in favor of leaving things alone as the Liberals piled up last month. Nevertheless, without in any way minimizing these subsidiary issues, it remains the fact that, taking the country as a whole, they were subsidiary issues and not the predominant ones, and that the fiscal question overtopped all others. I doubt, for instance, whether there was a single convinced Protectionist who voted for the Liberals because of his objection to Chinese Labor or the Education Act. I doubt, again, whether there was a single convinced Free-Trader who voted against the Liberals because he approved of the policy of the late Government in all other matters. On both sides, the final and compelling argument was the opinion the individual voter had formed on the merits of Mr. Chamberlain's and Mr. Balfour's

fiscal policies; and, though heroic efforts are still being made to explain the result away, it cannot seriously be doubted that the country decided, and meant to decide, against Protection in any form. No one is quite so hardy as to deny that, had the Unionists gone into the fight unhampered by the fiscal issue, they would have made a far better showing. They would probably have been defeated in any case, but they would not have been, as they are, snowed under. It made comparatively little difference at the polls whether the candidate was a Chamberlainite or a Balfourite. In either case, he was held to be tarred with the same brush, and the conservatism of the British people would have none of him. After three years of incessant agitation in Parliament, in the press and on the platform, in the course of which every aspect of Protection and Free Trade was meticulously canvassed, it seems to me almost a species of dementia to pretend either that Protection was not the controlling issue of the campaign or that the country did not pronounce emphatically against it.

Nevertheless, there are Unionists who make this pretension. They insist, what is perfectly true, that the turnover in the number of votes cast was nothing like so great as the turnover in Parliamentary representation, that where Free Trade polled a hundred votes Protection polled nearly ninety, that the issue was confused by secondary questions, that an extraordinary conjunction of circumstances such as is never likely to occur again played into the hands of the Free-Traders, that the result of the first clash between Protection and free imports gives ground for hope rather than despondency, and that Unionists have only to persevere in Mr. Chamberlain's footsteps to reach their ultimate goal. That is the view of the "whole-hoggers." They emphasize it by pointing to Mr. Chamberlain's success in Birmingham and to Mr. Balfour's defeat at Manchester. They attribute the disaster which has overtaken them partly to defective organization, but chiefly to Mr. Balfour's ambiguities, half-heartedness and hesitations; and they are fiercely maintaining that the Unionist party has only to be reconstituted on a more democratic and representative basis, has only to get rid of the domination of the "country-house clique," and has only to commit itself to Mr. Chamberlain's programme to be certain of the future. Whether those calculations are ill or well founded, action based upon them can only lead to a second and more disastrous split in the Unionist ranks.

Mr. Chamberlain is not cast down and means to commit the Unionist party to his policy and to continue fighting for it as long as he lives. The internal situation in the Unionist ranks is, at present, full of fascinating perplexity. I dare not even attempt to predict its outcome, but I may repeat, without endorsing, the rumor that Mr. Chamberlain may in the end attempt a compromise by dropping his food taxes and striving to rally the party on a ten-per-cent. duty on foreign manufactured goods. Whether such an attempt, if really made, would succeed in its object cannot at present be determined. In any case the chances of reconstituting the party on its old Free-Trade basis seem to be almost infinitely remote. In a greater or less degree it appears inevitable that the Unionist party will emerge from its present confusions pledged to a policy of fiscal change. Whether that programme will not prove a greater millstone round its neck than even Home Rule proved round the neck of Liberalism is an interesting speculation. Mr. Chamberlain looks forward apparently to winning over to his side both the Nationalists and the Labor Party; and I am by no means disposed to lay it down that his anticipations may not ultimately be realized. The Nationalists even now are not on his side only because they are Home-Rulers before they are Protectionists. If Mr. Chamberlain can find the means to satisfy their purely Irish demands, they would not hesitate a moment about forming an alliance with him. The Labor Party he hopes to conciliate by an advanced programme of social reform. Here again it is not certain that he will fail. The problem of finding the money for the measures which the Labor men advocate, without having recourse to indirect taxation, will puzzle Liberals, will puzzle Labor, and may lead to a secession of Labor to the ranks of Protection.

Quite apart from everything else, the General Election of January, 1906, will always be memorable as marking the first emergence in English politics of a definite Labor Party. Fifty-one Labor men have been returned to the House. Twenty-nine of these are pledged to act independently of both Liberals and Conservatives. They will sit on the Opposition benches; they will have their own whips and their own organization; they will vote with an exclusive regard to the interests of their class. That means, for one thing, the beginning or rather the development of the group system in the English House of Commons. It

means, for another, that the working classes are becoming conscious of their political power, are throwing off the domination of caste and social influences, and are determined for the future to be represented in the national legislature by men of their own class. Quite apart from the programme which they will advocate, that is to my mind a singularly auspicious omen. It foreshadows the day when England will be as democratic in fact and spirit as she long has been in her political forms. In these communications I have frequently insisted that the Labor Party is the coming party in English politics. The infusion of these direct, hard-headed, severely practical men, every one of whom has served a long apprenticeship in affairs on municipal councils and on the committees of their trades-unions and benevolent societies, is not a phenomenon to be deplored, still less to be alarmed at. It will make, on the whole, for national efficiency, and for a juster valuation of the really important things in politics and society. On most points, for the present at any rate, the Labor men will be found supporting the Government. The two principal measures of the opening session are assumed to be bills for amending the Education Act and reversing the decision of the House of Lords in the Taff Vale case. These are measures that the Labor men will undoubtedly support. The time, however, will undoubtedly come when official Liberalism will find itself unable to comply with the demands of the Extreme Left. Then will come Mr. Chamberlain's opportunity for driving a wedge into the Government ranks—if he can.

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ST. PETERSBURG, *February, 1906.*

A FEW weeks ago, Russia was jubilant and revolutionary; to-day, on the eve of the elections, she is sober and conservative. For it is with nations as with individuals; after the gay carnival comes the black fast; the day of dissipation is followed by a week of the blues. And the vastness of the change that has come over the nation is as striking as its suddenness. In October, the revolutionary spirit was omnipresent and well-nigh irresistible. It cheered the pessimistic, made the phlegmatic enthusiastic and converted some of the most aristocratic to the cause of the democracy. Many a Saul of the revolution became a Paul overnight, while less noteworthy conversions by the hundred were so common that they soon ceased to evoke surprise. It was a veri-

table harvest-time for psychologists, who could study the soul-states of the crowd, follow their rapid transitions as never before. The cases one came across were truly curious. I remember one man, in particular, who enjoyed a literary reputation in Russia and deserved it. He was also one of those fitfully demonstrative patriots who love their country as Mrs. Micawber loved her husband; and he consequently looked askance at the United States and Great Britain as the real enemies lurking behind Japan. He was a *bourgeois* of the *bourgeois*, when the lightning-flash of the revolution revealed the truth to him and he became a Social Democrat overnight. Thenceforth his zeal knew no bounds, his will brooked no contradiction, his views admitted no doubt. That was in October. . . . A reactionary wave has passed over the land since then, drawing in many scores of thousands. It swept away that literary convert to Socialism from the presence of his comrades, and many others with him.

The capers cut by the officials were especially amusing. Prematurely giving up the Autocracy as lost, large numbers of them made hot haste to turn from what they deemed the setting to the rising sun. They announced that they had always been democrats at heart, had always known that the régime was rotten and would fall to pieces. The Autocracy, on which they had lived and still were living, they proceeded to scourge with tongues that stung like scorpions, until there was not a sound place left in it. "A man's foes shall be those of his own household." Some of these new converts actually supplied the popular party with materials for their indictments of the dynasty; they revealed state secrets, they refused to forward official telegrams. Over them, too, the reactionary wave has since rolled, blotting out impressions that lately seemed deep and abiding, and these men now fulminate against the Government for not employing repressive measures early enough. The revolutionary rabble ought to have been treated with shrapnel. Witté, who failed thus to deal with them, is a traitor. He richly deserves to be impeached and punished or punished and impeached. As for them, they have been true to the Autocracy all along, its real friends in need.

That the revolution should have lost its glamour in the eyes of the struggling classes who have something to lose, needs no explanation. It is human nature. But the attitude of the peasants is less easy to grasp, and a good deal more depends upon their



conduct. If the peasants keep the peace, all is well for a long time. For, in Russia proper, the armed insurrection is virtually suppressed, and the only care of the authorities is lest it should break out in Spring anew in the guise of agrarian disturbances.

The Russian peasant is an enigma, even to his own people. You can seldom tell what he will say or do about any question whatever, unless it refer to his land, to God or the Tsar. And then he thinks and acts like his forefathers two or three hundred years ago. Those are the three essential elements of which time and eternity seem to him composed. He loves the land, and is in most cases ready to "crawl out of his skin" to increase his share of it. He does not always think pillage, arson, and even violence against the person too high a price to pay for a slice of a nobleman's property, especially if others share part of his responsibility for these misdeeds. God and the Tsar are also of the essence of his life, and although many mujiks were attracted by the seductive pictures of a republic which professional revolutionists drew for them, they nearly all insisted that the Tsar should be the acknowledged "Emperor of the commonwealth." Politics, therefore, as such, have no more charm for the average peasant than the higher mathematics, of which he understands no less. Hence, the only way to win him over to the popular movement is by promising him land for nothing, and that is precisely what the revolutionists and several Liberals freely did, and did in the name of God and the Tsar. "The soil," they said, "is God's, not the noblemen's, therefore the Tsar has given it to the peasant. Let them take and till it." And, accordingly, they took it, sacked the manors, in many instances burned them and divided the spoil among themselves. That was the only point of contact between the revolutionists and the peasantry, the one gave freely what belonged to their neighbors, and the others took what was thus given. Then came the day of judgment, when the spoil had to be disgorged, the land vacated, punishment endured; and the last state was recognized as worse than the first. The truth is that both revolutionists and democrats committed a grave mistake in their treatment of the peasants. Aiming at immediate results, they bribed instead of educating them—and, what was still worse, bribed them with the property of other people which the whole State was able and minded to protect.

Here is an instance of how the prophets of the revolution went

to work: A peaceful little village named Khorino, some four hours' railway journey from St. Petersburg, was thrilled one night by the arrival of thirty-eight strange men and eight strange women. It was hours after every one had gone to bed; and the visitors made straight for the schoolhouse and put up at the schoolmaster's. But they had come for business, and, without a moment's delay, they called a meeting of the peasants, of whom some eighty, including women and children, were brought together. One of the speakers cried: "Sugar really costs seven copecks, but the retailers are charging you seventeen. Isn't that true? The cost price of flour is four roubles, but the dealers make you pay five and a half." And the upshot of his address was to prove that the Duma was a delusion and a snare for the peasants. The proper course for them would be to take revolvers and rifles and begin to pillage the country houses of the landlords. That, the speakers added, could now be done with impunity, because there were no authorities any more. An old peasant objected that the Tsar was still there. "Not at all," they answered. "He too has been removed. We have no need of a Tsar now; he is a needless luxury." Then another of the peasants urged that in any case God would punish them if they broke their oath of allegiance. But the revolutionists took a cigarette, stuck it into the glittering image of St. Nicholas, and asked: "Come now, what do you think? Is that a holy image? Isn't it a mere dry spruce board?"

At this the peasants murmured and left the house, for their religious sentiment was deeply hurt. Next day, the agitators were driven off and compelled to return to their homes. Then another emissary went to the half-station Oksochy, and handed in a telegram addressed to St. Petersburg. The official explained he had orders to accept none but official telegrams, and then the emissary, raising a revolver, shot him dead. Other revolutionists came and showed written orders compelling the peasants to give them their horses from place to place *gratis*. The final verdict of the peasantry in that part of the country was: "The Emperor acknowledges us as citizens, he gives us admittance to the Duma. But the gentry don't wish us to enter, so they send strange people with revolvers against us."

That is only one instance, but it stands for many. The Socialists who preach violence use the promise of free land as a lever.

They do not, of course, mean to fulfil it, for that would be to renounce Socialism; they only intend to rouse the peasantry against society, and they are successful. On the other hand, the parties of order cannot hold out any such seductive prospects, because they believe in the principle of private property. Hence, they are seriously handicapped. The revolutionists can be generous, nay prodigal, with other people's possessions.

Here is an instructive example of how the oracle is worked. In South Russia, there is a county of the province of Poltava known as the Lokhvitsky District. The Revolutionary League occupied it, and at first struck terror to the hearts of the peaceful inhabitants. But they promised to confiscate the estates of the landlords and gentry and distribute them among the peasants, giving nine acres to each—not less than nine acres. And the mujiks, believing, were delighted. Yet the truth is that, in the entire province of which Lokhvitsky is but a mere fraction, all the arable land that exists, if taken and divided among the peasants, would give less than an acre and a half for each. In the Lokhvitsky District, the share would not be even as much.

Anarchy would have been the outcome of this movement if the authorities had not succeeded in checking it. The difficulty lay and still lies in the lack of troops. But, none the less, the peasants have of late been picking up wholesome ideas on the principle and practice of private property. And already they are mistrustful of the speechmaker from the city, who is generally a peace-breaker as well. They are beginning to grasp the fact that the abolition of property is a weapon that might be employed against themselves. They also understand that the transfer of landed property cannot be permanently effected without writing, signing and sealing. Therefore, many of them are now writing to their landlords asking them to sell them lots on reasonable terms, the money to be advanced by the Peasants' Bank in accordance with the imperial ukase recently promulgated. And in the villages there is a growing revulsion of feeling against extreme Liberalism.

Before the armed insurrection broke out, Liberalism of the most uncompromising character was popular everywhere. People were anxious, above all things, to see the old régime abolished, and, believing that violence only could effect it, they secretly or openly held with those who preached and employed force.

Almost everywhere, this moral support was freely accorded, money was subscribed, hospitality extended, information volunteered. "*Écrasez l'infâme!*" was the watchword of the enemies of the Autocracy, and their name was legion. If at that time the elections had been held, it is probable that a large majority of the elected would have been extreme radicals. The Minister President, it is affirmed by some of those who know him, would also have been a friend of the popular party. That, however, is merely surmise. What is certain is that everything would have been different from what it is and will be. In the days before the armed rising, Liberalism was still a cherished dream from which the nation hoped to awaken to a millennium. There had been as yet no disillusion. Since then it has become a nightmare, the recollection of which gives quiet folk a shudder. The violent action is being followed by a correspondingly violent reaction.

Who is to blame? The Liberals timidly accuse the revolutionists, while the moderates lay the responsibility upon the radicals, who expected to see order emerge from anarchy, prosperity emanate from destruction. But the unbiassed outsider will probably be disposed to look upon the conduct of the Russian people, and of each of its parties, as the national outcome of character, training and mental condition. It is clear that the Slav nation lacks political education and self-control; has no idea of tactics, no habit of discipline, hardly yet a standard by which to separate the secondary from the essential, the final goal from the intermediate aims which differ little from the means. The elements of the population that display an interest in public affairs are animated by a spirit of insubordination which makes it hard for them to combine. They are atoms which would seem to repel rather than attract each other, so that in lieu of a few strong parties a large number of little groups are likely to be formed. Moreover, they are more deeply moved by purely personal considerations than by patriotism, discerning friends and enemies where we should expect them to see only Russia and her destinies. This, too, will doubtless be remedied in time, but it seems premature to expect a change to-day or to-morrow. The fact that certain powerful parties have been called into being, such as the Constitutional Democrats, the Party of Order, the Party of October 30th, hardly weakens the force of my remarks. The members of those bodies hold together most loosely, the bond that links them being often

agreement on some secondary matter, while they disagree in essentials. The Constitutional Democratic Party, for example, contains republicans and monarchists, men who would nationalize the land and men who would resist nationalization by force if necessary; politicians who are willing to employ the machinery of the Duma for reform, and others who obstinately refuse to accept a Duma or any chamber not invested with the functions of a constituent assembly. And all these mutually repellent elements are for the moment gathered together as chance pedestrians might be assembled under an archway during a violent shower of rain. In a few weeks or months they will probably have split up into a number of little groups.

A majority of advanced Liberals would in all probability have been sent to the first Russian Duma if there had been no insurrection. But now? Events which then seemed surer even than that are now become doubtful. Security for life and property appears a much greater boon to the struggling masses than political rights which most of them are incapable of grasping. I should not be surprised in the least if the nation were to return a majority of moderates resolved to take their stand on the platform of the October Manifesto. That the Government will exert any pressure on the voters is absolutely excluded. It would run counter to the psychology of the people. Moreover, political considerations will play but a slender part in the struggle of the parties. The average Russian man cares extremely little what political programme is represented by this candidate or that. What concerns him infinitely more is that Ivanoff his friend, or Petroff his enemy, wants to be sent to St. Petersburg to help the Tsar to govern the Empire, and his feelings towards the concrete individual whom he loves or hates will shape his vote.

Sadder far than the probable return of a lukewarm majority to the Duma is another result of the violence of the insurgents. The enfranchisement of the Jews may long be delayed in consequence. I sincerely hope I may be unduly pessimistic, but I cannot get rid of the impression made by a long sequel of phenomena which cannot be enumerated here. When the October Manifesto was promulgated, the Jewish question was uppermost in men's minds, and so little doubt was entertained that the secular grievances of that much-suffering people would be shortly redressed that many journalists fancied it was a question of weeks

only, while a few believed a report then circulating that a ukase was being written abolishing the existence of the Ghetto or Jewish Pale of Settlement. Count Witté was known to be in favor of full enfranchisement and equal rights, while the workmen, the intellectuals, and a very large section of the officials concurred in his view. Looking around for support in the country, the Minister President naturally and in the first place relied on the Hebrew elements. If they would not stand by him from sentiment or political conviction, they certainly would from interest. So he hoped, nay thought.

But the Jews were among the first to abandon Witté. They would enfranchise themselves by their own efforts. They were as the swimmer who, feeling that he can freely float and move in the water, discards his cork belt. Had they not materially contributed to win the battle of freedom? They had sacrificed their racial and denominational aims and pooled their interests with those of the Russian revolutionists, swearing to stand or fall with these. It was on that basis that they founded the famous Bund or Revolutionary League, which has produced many of the most fearless, heroic and cruel terrorists in all Russia. The revolutionist leader whose name is a clarion to thousands, the redoubted "Maxim," whose adventures are the theme of a cycle of legends, is a Jew. The Jewish organizations, one of them the Bund, were among the revolutionary societies that summoned the Russian people to withdraw gold from the Savings and State Banks, to refuse payment in paper, and to rise up in arms against the Government of the Tsar. Among the results were the last great strike, the insurrection in Moscow and other cities, the bloodshed which still continues, the financial losses, and, worse than all else, the economic and psychic derangement of the Russian nation.

It was a terrible, an irreparable, mistake! There is a tide in the affairs of people as of individuals which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune, and unless the symptoms were unusually deceptive it came for the Russian Jews on the 30th of October. Not that Witté was their Moses who would work miracles for them. Even if they had rallied round him, he is far too cautious a politician to have endangered success by haste. Measures of relief, partial, indeed, but most welcome, he would have bestowed. A number of them were outlined, some were even drafted; but before they could be enacted as statutes the Jews had thrown in their

lot with the Russian revolutionists, and after that no more was heard about the partial reforms. Two of the least important were, indeed, carried out by the Finance Minister; but then the impulse died out, and the last state of the ill-starred Jews is likewise worse than the first.

If Count Witté and his Cabinet, many urge, were truly Liberal, they ought never to have abandoned the Jewish cause, however dissatisfied they might have been with the attitude of the Jews. And that is, undoubtedly, true. If it be ethically wrong, as it certainly is, to treat a cultured people as an inferior race, it is no answer to the charge to plead hostility on the part of their leaders. Two blacks do not yet make a white. But that is not Count Witté's plea. What his few friends advance in his behalf is this: his plan was to grant the Jews a good deal of relief in secondary matters, but not to confer equal rights upon them, because that was beyond his power. The Russian people represented by the Duma is alone competent to strike off their fetters once for all. But it was possible, probable, nay all but certain, that they would have done that if the Russian Liberal movement had been guided by political common sense. If the Jews, whose influence upon that movement was powerful, had held aloof from the armed rising and thus enabled Count Witté to lean upon the Liberals, the Duma would certainly have had a sweeping majority of delegates favorable to the enfranchisement of the Jews.

At present, that is but a melancholy chapter of the depressing records of things that might have been. A heavy wave of reaction had swept over Russia, washed away those Liberal impressions before they could serve as moulds for legislation. Witté's views are immaterial to the issue; for, if Witté were as Liberal as Abraham Lincoln, he would still be almost as powerless as a Sioux chief, unless he had a strong Liberal following, and that was denied him chiefly by the Jews. It was a curious conjuncture: on the one side, a formidable body, almost a whole nation, proclaiming Liberal principles and needing a cautious leader; on the other side, a successful leader looking out for a Liberal party; between them, a little hollow which the prominent leaders deliberately deepened and widened until it became an impassable gulf. The leader and the party never met.

And now there has come a period of meditation. *La Russie se recueille.*

BERLIN, *February, 1906.*

SUNDAY, January 21st, the anniversary of the massacre of St. Petersburg, was a notable day in the annals of German Social Democracy. The leaders of the movement had decided to celebrate the occasion by convening meetings throughout the Empire, for the purpose of proclaiming their sympathy with their Russian "comrades," and of formulating the popular demand for the abolition, in favor of manhood suffrage, of the three-class system of election to the State Diets. No sooner was the intention of the Social Democrats made known than it was denounced by the Conservatives as a revolutionary plot. What the Socialists secretly proposed, and the Reactionaries affirmed, was to organize street demonstrations in all the big towns of Germany, and, in particular, to furnish the world with a Berlin sequel of the St. Petersburg tragedy by marching in procession before the Imperial Palace, with the object of extorting the suffrage from the hands of the Emperor-King. The alarm, thus sounded, awakened far-reaching echoes. In Saxony, the Government at once issued a general prohibition against all public meetings announced for January 21st, and in Berlin proclamations were posted at every corner warning the inhabitants that, in case of emergency, the police would be assisted by the military in ruthlessly suppressing all attempts to improvise street demonstrations. The manifest nervousness of the authorities was intensified, at this juncture, by the intelligence of serious rioting in Hamburg, where some fifty thousand workmen had ceased work in order to attend meetings of protest against the enactment of a Bill, designed to deprive them of the right to elect their own representatives in the Legislature of the Republic of Hamburg. At the close of the meetings, sanguinary conflicts had occurred between the police and bodies of Hooligans, who had attempted to invade the precincts of the Municipal Buildings; and in several streets barricades had been erected. The Social Democratic leaders were moved by these disturbances promptly to disavow all participation in them on the part of their followers; and they were in a position to support their denial by pointing to the fact that the mob, in addition to a number of private shops, had devastated a Social Democratic Cooperative Store. As regards the contemplated meetings in Berlin, the leaders did not hesitate to affirm that the intention of organizing demonstrations in the streets had never existed.



The tranquillizing assurances of the Socialist chiefs were dismissed with contumely by the reactionaries, who redoubled their exhortations to the Government to enforce "exceptional measures against the dangerous agitation of the revolutionaries." The consequence was that, when Sunday arrived, Berlin was found to be, for all practical purposes, in a state of petty siege. Inside the Imperial Palace, where at noon the Emperor was to preside over the annual *Ordensfest*, or Decoration Festival, several companies of mounted troops were assembled; and in the Imperial liveries, behind the palace, an imposing force of artillery stood in readiness to send its "whiff of grape-shot" coursing through the streets. The barracks of all the regiments garrisoned in and around Berlin were also filled with troops, armed as for a campaign, and awaiting the order which, fifteen years before, the Emperor had foreshadowed in the following memorable words: "It is possible, in view of the present Socialistic machinations, that I may order you to shoot down your own relatives, brothers, nay, your parents—which God forefend—but even then you must obey my commands without a murmur."

The streets were teeming with policemen. All of them carried swords and revolvers, and they were ranged in chain formation at regular intervals across the roads. Near them—a highly significant feature—stood the self-appointed agents of the Social Democratic party, conspicuously adorned with red rosettes, and actively assisting the official guardians of the law in preventing the formation of crowds. This formal recognition on the part of the authorities of the ability of the "Party of Disorder," as it is usually designated, to cooperate, on special occasions, in the task of preserving order is justly regarded by the Social Democrats as one of the most important achievements of the day; for the *début* of their proletarian police was uniformly successful. They did duty at no less than ninety-three Assembly Halls, all of which were packed, and in each locality they preserved perfect order.

A foreigner, accustomed to the liberal institutions of the United States or of Great Britain, could not but admire the spirit of discipline pervading the meetings. The key-note of the orations was a deep-set determination to strive, by constitutional means and through the medium of the existing laws, to obtain increased political liberties, designed eventually to enable the working-

classes to acquire predominant political power. "The proletariat," observed one orator, "is well aware that it would be hopelessly worsted in open conflict with the military. It does not propose to try conclusions of that character. But the Russian revolution has taught it that it possesses, in the general strike, a far more effective instrument than armed resistance for the defence of its rights and privileges." Beneath the platform from which these words were delivered lay concealed a formidable body of police, prepared to fire on the meeting at the least sign of disturbance. It was a superfluous precaution. The assembly, which had been frequently admonished by its rosetted agents against yielding to provocation in any form, was exultant in the sense of its own disciplined order. With stentorian cheers, it carried a resolution of sympathy with the "comrades" in Russia in their fight against an effete Autocracy; and to that resolution was added a second, denouncing the "monstrous injustice" embodied in the three-class system of election prevailing in Prussia, and demanding, in virile language, the substitution for it of the principle of manhood suffrage. That done, the many thousands who had attended the meeting poured into the streets and passed peacefully through the multitudinous lines of armed police on their way home. Every one of the ninety-three meetings ended thus; and in the provinces the public order was preserved equally intact. Throughout the Empire not a shot was fired nor was a single demonstrator arrested. "Red Sunday," in fact, was come and gone: it lives in history under the mocking sobriquet of "Quiet Sunday."

It must be admitted, however, that the Social Democrats were partly responsible for the excitement which preceded their grand demonstration. For months they had indulged in language of the most exalted description. At Jena, where the Party Congress was held in September, they spent two whole days in discussing the probable attitude of the military when the time should arrive for the proletariat to "go into the streets." Bebel himself proclaimed his conviction that the soldiers would not "shoot down their relatives, their brothers, nay, even their parents," but would make common cause with the "comrades." The army, he exclaimed, is permeated with the spirit of Social Democracy, and when the day of revolution dawns, entire regiments will side with the people in defending their rights. The professed confidence of the great demagogue in the "enlightenment" of the

army was not, however, allowed to pass unchallenged; and several speakers, notably the Trades-Union leaders, emphatically admonished the Congress that, on the first sign of revolution, the German Government, to adopt Mr. Krüger's phrase, would "stagger humanity" even more effectively than the Russian Cossacks had done. The upshot of the debate was that Bebel feigned astonishment at the "sanguinary deductions" made from his remarks, and that the Congress passed a diluted resolution, approving of the general strike as the only effective means of repelling any reactionary attack on the Imperial suffrage, and of wresting the concession of an extended suffrage from the various State Governments. The Jena Congress was followed by the forcible elimination from the councils of the party executive of the so-called "intellectuals," who are in favor of an opportunist policy of cooperation, for immediate purposes, with the Parliamentary representatives of the *bourgeoisie*; and for some months the agitation was fomented by systematic appeals to the passions of the proletariat. Frau Rosa Luxemburg, now one of the most prominent figures in the party, publicly boasted that the general strike in Russia had been largely engineered by the German comrades; and she added that the spirit of revolution was destined to travel from the "demolished Empire of the Tsar" to the western states of Europe, where its ideals would be realized, not with the aid of barricades, which were impotent against modern artillery, but by the enforcement of the principle of the general strike, which would infallibly bring the forces of capitalism to their knees. The reactionaries indulged in language of a not less inflammatory character. Their newspapers bristled with appeals to the Imperial authorities regarding the evils of manhood suffrage, as illustrated in the composition of the Reichstag. To Social Democracy, they argued, manhood suffrage is as the breath of life: abolish it, establish for the Empire a franchise similar in principle to that prevailing in the states of Prussia and Saxony, and the revolutionary movement will be deprived of the possibility of further development.

In fact the extremists in both camps seemed bent on organizing a conflict. Count Posadowsky, the Secretary of the Interior, whose moral courage has on more than one occasion proved to be a most valuable asset of the Government, therefore, deemed the moment appropriate for an appeal to the conscience of the

country. He addressed a remarkable homily to the Reichstag on the subject of Social Democracy. After expatiating with great eloquence on the admirable social legislation of the Empire, on the blessings conferred upon the working classes by the State Insurance Laws, on the rapidly growing prosperity of all classes of the community, and on the excellence and incorruptibility of the public services, he asked his hearers to ponder, in a spirit of detachment, upon the possible causes of the existence of a party of three million voters, who were filled with implacable resentment against an order of society from which they derived such unique advantages. Count Posadowsky admitted that the social legislation begun under Bismarck was conceived with the idea of propitiating the working-men, and that it had failed conspicuously in that object. But he warned the legislators of the Empire, some of whom were irritated and others profoundly discouraged by this failure, in the most solemn language, against withdrawing their hands from the plough and abandoning all further attempts to perfect their social laws. They must pursue their task, he said, as a matter of conscience, and not of mere expediency. From these general observations the Imperial Secretary passed on to exhibit in detail some of the causes of Social Democracy. He deplored the policy pursued by the great employers of labor in their persistent refusal to distinguish between the working classes, as such, and the Social Democrats. Attention has been called in these pages on a previous occasion to the blunder of which the German capitalists are guilty in their deliberate neglect to differentiate between the trades-unionist and the Marxian movement: how, instead of exploiting the inherent antagonism between the economic and the political organizations of the working classes, they seemed determined to confuse them and to weld them indissolubly into one, possibly with the design of fighting the trades-unions by imputing to them a revolutionary character. At this fundamental error Count Posadowsky pointed a justly accusing finger. He indicted the propertied classes of the Empire on account of what he described as their moral impotency to overcome an essentially materialistic movement. Social Democracy, he reminded them, was admittedly and professedly materialistic. But the wealthier classes seemed to be no less steeped in materialism: revelling in their newly acquired riches, they too frequently overlooked the necessity of

making self-sacrifices in the interests of society. Finally, Count Posadowsky turned to the State, and confessed himself unable to acquit it on the charge of contributing to the spread of Social Democracy by its rigid adherence to the traditions of a pettifogging bureaucracy and police.

It was a bold homily; and it aroused among the conservative sections of the community a storm of indignation against its author. But, since "Red Sunday" earned the nickname of "Quiet Sunday," people are recalling its precepts, and signs are even apparent that Prince von Bülow is approximating to the standpoint of his able and thoughtful lieutenant. Within the last few days he has definitely refused the request of the reactionaries, preferred in the Upper Chamber of the Prussian Diet, for the introduction of special legislation, after the Bismarckian pattern of repression, against the Social Democratic movement. While summoning the parties of the *bourgeoisie*, in necessarily ineffective language, to unite against that movement, he has made a significant concession to the spirit of parliamentary government by proclaiming his willingness to satisfy the demand, so frequently urged by the Reichstag, for the payment of its members. It is, indeed, not impossible that the striking proof of their discipline furnished by the Social Democrats on "Quiet Sunday" may eventually mark a turning-point in the domestic policy of Germany. For it is plain that Russia, which the statesmen of Berlin have in times past worshipped as the bulwark of Autocracy, has nothing more to teach them, unless it be the advisability of directing their eyes westward in search of successful methods of government. Already the retreat from Russian ante-revolutionary ideas has been sounded by the states of South Germany. In the Grand Duchy of Baden, a more liberal franchise has quite recently come into operation; in Bavaria, manhood suffrage is about to be introduced; in Saxony, the Government has announced its determination to revise on modern lines the electoral law, which it enacted three years ago in consonance with the reactionary Prussian model; and the Grand Duchy is now preparing to imitate the example of Baden. In these circumstances, it can, notwithstanding the retrograde step taken by the Republic of Hamburg, be merely a question of time before the Kingdom of Prussia yields to the cry for reform raised by the Social Democrats; for the justice of that cry is admitted by all liberal

minds. More than thirty years ago, Bismarck himself described the Prussian electoral law as the most wretched and inefficient of all systems. Its effect to-day is to exclude from all possibility of Parliamentary representation a party which, under the operation of manhood suffrage, polls three millions of votes in the elections to the Reichstag. Under the three-class system, the Social Democrats are without a single voice in the Prussian Diet, whose legislative functions are practically monopolized by the landed aristocracy. No less a person than the heir to the Bavarian throne, the only German prince who occasionally profits by the precedent set by the Emperor to indulge in the luxury of political oratory, has denounced this state of affairs. The press of South Germany has informed Prince von Bülow that under the sway of liberal laws, it is unnecessary for the parties of the *bourgeoisie* to unite against the Social Democratic movement; that the Social Democrats of South Germany are far less "revolutionary" in their sentiments than those of Prussia; and that the Prussian Autocracy, if it desires to prosper, will do well to sever its moral alliance with the principles of Tsardom and to approximate its legislation to the ideals of Western Europe.

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WASHINGTON, *February, 1906.*

THE questions in which the Executive and Legislative departments of our Federal Government are most deeply interested continue to be, as they were last month, the fate of the bill conferring on the Interstate Commerce Commission the power to fix rates for railways; the disposition likely to be made of the Philippine Tariff bill; the reception which the Statehood bill may expect in the Senate; the outcome of the attempt to secure the ratification of the Santo Domingo Treaty, and the course which Congress may see fit to pursue with regard to the Panama Canal. Concerning four of these questions, the attitude of the Senate seems already defined. The Hepburn bill, embodying a method of rate-making which was supposed to have the President's approval, has but little, if any, chance of passing the Senate, though the House of Representatives adopted it by a stupendous majority, only seven votes being recorded against it. Even if the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce should report the bill by a majority of one, the large minority which insists upon amending it would prosecute the contest on the floor of the Senate-Chamber, and

probably would succeed in carrying the desired amendment. What such Senators as Mr. Foraker, Mr. Lodge, Mr. Aldrich and their coadjutors are resolved upon is that a railway rate fixed by the Commission, if the railroad affected by it appeals from it, shall not become operative until it has been sustained by the courts. In advocacy of an amendment to that effect, Senator Lodge made a powerful speech; and it is known that some of the soundest lawyers and most effective orators in the Senate will follow him on the same side. All the Democrats will be arrayed in the opposite camp, and so will a certain number of Republicans, including, it appears, three members of the Interstate Commerce Committee. Whether the friends of the bill, however, can muster thirteen Republicans, the number needed to transform the thirty-two Democrats into a majority, is considered very doubtful. Concerning the position now taken by President Roosevelt toward the measure there are conflicting reports, from which the most reasonable conclusion seems to be that he would rather have the bill amended than not passed at all.

The Statehood bill, upon which also the House of Representatives set the stamp of approbation, must be subjected to amendment in the Senate, it is generally believed, if it is to become a law. Senator Foraker is determined to get inserted in the bill, as it came from the House, a provision that the question whether Arizona and New Mexico shall be admitted to the Union as a single State shall be submitted to the inhabitants of those Territories separately. Should a majority in either Territory reply in the negative, the proposed unification will not take place. If we are correctly informed, the bill, thus amended, would not entirely fall to the ground in the event of an adverse vote in Arizona or New Mexico, but those sections which authorize the admission of Oklahoma and Indian Territory into the Union as one State would remain operative. Mr. Foraker's hope of carrying his amendment rests on the assumption that he can control sixteen of his Republican colleagues, and secure in addition almost every Democratic vote. Were he deserted by six, or even five, Democrats his amendment might be defeated. If the outcome of Mr. Foraker's amendment shall be to preserve the Territorial status of Arizona and New Mexico for an indefinite term, no inhabitant of the larger States will grieve, for both of them put together fall signally short of the

population that ought to be exacted for Statehood, and Senator Beveridge is unquestionably right in treating as utterly inadmissible the proposal that they be admitted separately.

Senator Lodge, who has in charge the Philippine Tariff bill, expresses confidence in his ability to secure the adoption of it by the Senate without any material change. Few onlookers are equally optimistic. The spokesmen of our beet-root sugar and cane-sugar interests, and the champions of our native tobacco interest, are much stronger in the Senate than they were in the House, and they are determined not to let the bill become a law in its present form. To the plea that equity requires us to treat the Filipinos as we have treated the Porto-Ricans, and to give the former, as we have given the latter, the boon of free trade with the United States, they answer that equity, like charity, begins at home, and that the Government has no moral right to expose our sugar and home-grown tobacco industries to a ruinous competition. Those who argue thus ought logically to advocate the immediate concession of absolute independence, not only to the Philippines, but also to Porto Rico, for the latter island likewise is a producer of sugar and tobacco. Logic and consistency, however, though, ultimately, they may generate an overwhelming public opinion, are not always omnipotent in a legislative chamber, and it looks as if a majority of the Senators could be prevailed upon to disregard the Porto-Rican precedent, and compel the sugar and tobacco of the Philippines to pay duties amounting to fifty (instead of twenty-five) per cent. of the Dingley rates for some time to come. That is to say, a majority of the Senate will consent, under pressure, to confess that, by the acquisition of the Philippines, we have placed ourselves in a position in which we cannot treat our new subjects justly without wronging our fellow citizens. As, of two duties, we ought to do that which is nearest to our hand, the unavoidable deduction from the premises is that we ought to give up the Philippines. The defeat or mutilation of the Philippine Tariff bill as it came from the House will give the anti-Imperialists an irresistible argument. The conscience of this nation will not stand for the strangulation of the sugar and tobacco industries of the Philippines.

Nobody expects to see the Santo Domingo Treaty reported to the Senate and submitted to a vote until the Republicans are sure of support from enough Democratic Senators to command rati-



fication. As there is a vacancy for Delaware, and as Mr. Burton of Kansas is not expected to vote or to be paired, we may say that there are eighty-eight votes in the Senate. Of these the Republicans have fifty-six and the Democrats thirty-two. If three Democrats would cooperate with the Republicans, the treaty would get fifty-nine votes, or the requisite two-thirds. We here assume, what is not quite certain, that every Republican Senator can be relied upon to uphold Mr. Roosevelt's interposition in Santo Domingo. But for the Democratic caucus, the required *quantum* of assistance from the Democratic side would undoubtedly have been forthcoming. As it is, only Senator Patterson of Colorado and Senator McEnery of Louisiana can, it seems, be relied upon. The speech in which the former defended his refusal to obey the caucus, though unquestionably sound in logic and morals, made no impression on his Democratic colleagues—mainly, doubtless, because he himself very recently voted to make the decision of a caucus binding upon all participants therein. We are told that Secretary Root is trying to make the treaty more acceptable to its Democratic critics, by modifying the clause authorizing the United States to interpose with force for the maintenance of order in Santo Domingo, a clause which underwent considerable alteration at the hands of the late Secretary Hay. As remoulded by Secretary Root, it will simply empower the United States to protect those American citizens who are engaged in the collecting of customs duties. We doubt whether even this careful restriction of our right to intervene will suffice to induce a majority of the Democratic Senators to rescind the caucus resolution. Meanwhile, until it has been submitted to a vote and definitely rejected, the treaty remains inchoate, and the *modus vivendi* continues under which American citizens appointed by the Dominican Executive are performing the function of collectors and distributors of the Dominican customs revenue.

What the Senate will do about the Panama Canal depends, doubtless, upon the general attitude of the Republican majority toward the Roosevelt Administration, which attitude will be affected materially by Mr. Roosevelt's acquiescence in an amendment of the rate-making bill. Should the Republican majority be unfriendly to Mr. Roosevelt, it could make itself exceedingly unpleasant by a drastic investigation of the work of the Canal Commission. The \$21,000,000 already appropriated to the Com-

mission will have been spent in a few weeks, and a large additional appropriation will be asked for. The American people find it very hard to understand how so huge a sum could have been disbursed, when not even the type of the canal has as yet been fixed upon. It is tolerably certain that, if we had decided to let the canal be constructed by contract, very little if any money would have been laid out by the contractor before he knew what kind of a canal was wanted. We have not yet even arrived at the preliminary decision. It is well known that, some time ago, a majority of the Board of Consulting Engineers recommended a sea-level canal. The Canal Commission, however, has not accepted that recommendation, but has reported to the President in favor of an 85-foot-level lock canal. If Mr. Roosevelt concurs in their opinion, he will submit their report with his approval to Congress. We take for granted that Congress will agree with the Commission in preferring the 85-foot-level lock canal, because it will cost much less than a sea-level waterway, and can be completed much more quickly. It is quite possible, however, that the Senate, if in an unsympathetic mood, may decline to place any more money in the hands of the Canal Commission, and may advise that the waterway be constructed either by Government engineers or by contract. It is probable that no contractor would undertake the task unless he were entirely untrammelled with respect to labor. If he had a free hand, he would employ Chinese. The Federal statute which forbids the importation of Chinese labor into the United States is inapplicable to the canal strip. When we consider how much trouble and odium has been brought upon the War Department by the canal business, we can appreciate the wariness which led Secretary Root to resist the proposed transfer of the management of the canal strip and inter-oceanic waterway to the Department of State. The widely current suspicions of the wisdom and trustworthiness of the Canal Commission have seriously impaired Judge Taft's popularity, and tend to disqualify him as a candidate for the Republican nomination for the Presidency. His elimination would leave the course pretty clear for Mr. Root. Mr. Roosevelt himself must be growing impatient at the dilatory movements of the Canal Commission, which he must recognize as the weak spot of his Administration.